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Abstract
Starting with a case-study we illustrate an emerging business model for the Industrial Internet of 
Things that applies to other ITC-based industries as well. We formalize this business model by 
importing the concept of structural holes into semantic networks and suggest that a similar logic 
applies to conceptual maps of consumers’ behaviour, too.
 
Introduction
Quick and free availability of information made possible by the Internet has rendered “business as 
usual” impossible in quite many established industries, ranging from music to news. Many firms 
have been forced to re-think the assumptions of their strategies, asking themselves what 
competencies would produce value and, most importantly, how they could harness it. The Internet 
forced many firms to elaborate radically new strategies and formulate new business models that 
would question assumptions that they had taken for granted. 
Disentangling the concepts of ‘strategy’ and ‘business model’ may not be easy on certain 
circumstances. One approach for conceptualizing the difference is that thinking about a business 
model implies exploring novel sources of value, whereas strategies are formulated even when no 
radical change is implied (Shafer et al., 2005; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). Another path towards 
a clear definition is eventually suggested by the observation that envisioning a business model 
implies exploring a set of possible strategies, only one of which is actually implemented 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010). Whatever the definitions that will eventually emerge, it is 
obvious that firms eventually conceive radically novel business models at certain points in time, and
that this happens with or without the Internet (Magretta, 2002; Teece, 2010). However, the Internet 
made many items available for free that were previously sold on a market, forcing many firms to 
conceive new business models.
Business models, in general, can be grouped into broad families. For instance, firms that provide 
free software must “sell” a product that is available at zero cost (e.g., the free Linux operating 
system), but they can make money by providing consultancy on how to install and maintain it. At 
first, this may struck the reader as quite novel a business model. However, consider what producers 
of airplane engines do: They typically sell their products at too low a price to make reasonable 
profits, but they take their earnings from all the maintenance these devices require. While not so 
extreme a strategy as those adopted by free-software vendors, it nonetheless follows a similar 
business model (Teece, 2010).
We believe that identifying broad categories of business models is useful for academics and 
practitioners alike and, indeed, many scholars have proposed sensible taxonomies  (Schweitzer, 
2005; Gunther McGrath, 2010). This paper reports on a Silicon Valley firm that is developing a 
novel and interesting business model in a field where lots of technological promises are made but 
little profits have been harnessed hitherto. While appreciating the innovativeness and peculiarities 
of a business model that is based on bridging between previously unrelated knowledge, we also 
recognized that this business model has certain similarities to those adopted by certain other firms 
in completely different fields. Thus, we illustrate our case-study as prototypical for a new class of 
business models based on the ability to bridge previously unrelated knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the ensuing section, the features and potentialities 
of the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) are discussed. The 
development of the IIoT is intertwined with the story of Echelon, a pioneer firm we studified as a 
case-study, will be illustrated in the second section. Echelon’s business model is expounded in the 
third section, and generalized into quite general a framework in the fourth section. The fifth section 
postulates that a similar framework governs certain features of consumers’ behavior, followed by 
conclusions in the sixth section.
Distributed Control, IoT and IIoT
The Internet created unprecedented possibilities for diffusion of information and coordination of 
behaviour, ranging from crowd-founding to virtual games to flash mobs. It did so by connecting 
millions of computers in a huge web where flows – unlike those of many previous communication 
media – are neither planned, nor centralized.
As early as in the 1980s, at a time when the Internet itself was still in its infancy, a few visionary IT 
specialists speculated that if microchips would be embedded in physical devices that would be 
allowed to communicate with one another, their functionalities would go beyond those of each 
single device (Wired, 1993). For example, an occupancy sensor, a light switch and a thermostat 
could regulate the lighting and temperature of a room as soon as someone entered it. Or, an alarm 
clock could wake you up but also send a message to a machine that brews a cup of coffee. Similar 
applications would span as diverse fields as the automation of large buildings, the management of 
agile productive plants, the regulation of flows along a grid of power plants or, in short, any setting 
where a large number of heterogeneous devices coordinate their operations while retaining some 
degree of flexibility.
In 1988, a few prominent Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and venture capitalists founded a company in
order to bring this vision to market. Echelon, so the name of the company, designed the Neuron, a 
microchip that could be embedded in physical devices which, in their turn, would be connected to 
one another through the power line network (PLN). Echelon would sell the Neuron and the LonTalk 
communication protocol, which together made up the LonWorks control technology (Lane and 
Maxfield, 2005, 2009).
The architecture designed by Echelon was radically different from the leading technological 
paradigm of that time. According to the received wisdom of the 1980s and 90s, sensors and 
actuators would be wired through a hierarchical set of data hubs which would route all information 
to a central computer which, in its turn, would issue appropriate commands to local devices. By 
contrast, Echelon set out to implement a distributed control architecture. Each device would be 
endowed with its own microchip, and each device would be able to communicate with any other.
Distributed control is technically superior to centralized control. Its advantages are due to (i) 
scalability, in the sense that devices can be added or taken away without re-programming the whole 
system, and (ii) reliability in front of power shortages, for several microchips working in parallel 
take a much shorter time to restore normal operation. From a purely technical point of view, there 
was no doubt that distributed control would make centralized control obsolete.
However, distributed control provides its largest benefits if a large number of heterogeneous devices
are connected, which are eventually produced by competing firms. Each of these firms may have an
interest in connecting its own devices to one another by means of a distributed architecture, but 
none of them is happy to see distributed networks where devices from different vendors compete 
with one another. Each producer in each industry strives to sign contracts where only its own 
products are used, so each producer typically adds any sort of technical difficulty to impair its 
devices from communicating with those of its competitors. Thus, we are experiencing the 
paradoxical reality of a superior technology that is technically available since the end of the 1980s, 
but that has not been allowed to spread into the economy hitherto (Rossi et al., 2009).
Distributed control did not spread, but it did not disappear either. Rather, it survived and diffused in 
specific market niches. Echelon did not thrive, but it did not go bankrupt either. It rather set on a 
slow but steady growth path, possibly disappointing with respect to the initial (exaggerated) 
expectations but respectably positive and reasonably good in the long run.
Quite surprisingly for the disillusioned fans of distributed control, the new century brought a new 
spike of great expectations. This new wave of expectations also had a brand new name: The 
Internet of Things would connect devices of any sort, making everything smart: smart cities, smart 
homes, etc. Remarkably, the new name did not stress technical superiority (distributed control vs. 
centralized control) but rather what the devices would do for the final user: They would provide 
smart environments because they would connect to one another just like computers do.
This focus on consumers is possibly connected with an afterthought that is likely to loom very large
in the minds of all actors involved, namely, the possibility that “smart” devices could be used in 
order to collect big data about consumers (European Parliament, 2015). If this will come true, then 
distributed control will finally spread, yet not because of its technical superiority but rather because 
it will allow better consumer profilation. It is a dream, or a nightmare, that is still far from coming 
true in any case.
Interestingly, Echelon is staying away from all talks about big data and IoT. It is focusing on the 
‘Industrial’ IoT instead (IIoT), where technical expertise matters and where profits can be made 
here and now rather than at some distant future. In retrospect, one may observe that throughout its 
whole existence Echelon stayed firmly within the IIoT although it switched its main focus from 
building automation to power grids to lighting throughout the years. In broad terms, we can observe
a certain constancy and coherence with its origins (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) co-existing with the
entrepreneurial ability of re-directing its core activities from building automation to power grids to 
smart urban environments and beyond.
We decided that Echelon’s recent developments were worth an investigation, which we did in 2015. 
We carried out a qualitative research following the guidelines of Classical Grounded Theory (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Orton, 1997), where our initial expectations concerned the interplay between 
constancy and adaptability in Echelon’s strategy. In particular, we made open-ended interviews to:
• Chris Dingley, VP for Sales (unrecorded);
• Robert Dolin, former CTO and VP for Engineering (recorded);
• Robert Maxfield, Board Member since inception (recorded);
• Sohrab Modi, CTO and VP for Engineering (unrecorded);
• Ronald Sege, CEO and Chairman of the Board (unrecorded).
Handwritten notes were taken in all interviews, including those where recording was not allowed. 
Excerpts from these notes were submitted for approval.
In parallel to interviewing Echelon we actively attended ongoing debates in Silicon Valley on IoT, 
IIoT and big data. In particular, we were struck by the scheme for a business model proposed by 
Claro Partners (2014), a specialized consultant. Following the methodology of Grounded Theory 
we combined Claro Partners’ insights with the inputs provided by Echelon in order to arrange 
higher-order concepts (Glaser, 2002; Glaser and Holton, 2004) which, in our case, translated into a 
business model that we found interesting and innovative. In a third stage concepts were re-arranged 
again, drawing similarities with experiences of other firms in different industries. Finally, we 
realized that certain aspects of this business model would shed light on consumers’ behavior as 
well.
It is worth to stress that, in accordance with the principles of Grounded Theory (Glaser, 2002), our 
interpretation of Echelon’s business model is not necessarily Echelon’s own interpretation. It is our 
own theory, grounded on testimonies provided by Echelon as well as other sources.
Change and Continuity
Echelon was founded in 1988 in order to provide distributed solutions to control problems affecting 
as diverse industries as machineries manufacturing, building automation, consumer durables, and 
beyond (Echelon, 1990). A choice had to be made. At that time, it seemed reasonable to begin with 
a section of building automation where the potential advantages from connecting devices to one 
another were substantial, the so-called HVAC industries (Heating, Ventilation, and Air 
Conditioning).
Echelon started selling its microchips in 1990. Its initial strategy consisted of stipulating agreements
with the main HVAC manufacturers in order to embed microchips in their devices. Since 1996, a 
new strategy complemented these agreements (Lane and Maxfield, 2005). According to this new 
strategy, Echelon would produce modules with embedded Neuron chips that interfaced via industry-
standard interfaces to devices of any maker. These general-purpose modules would be sold to 
independent 'System Integrators' who in their turn would provide networked solutions for building 
automation incorporating devices from multiple suppliers.
In 2000, the Italian electricity provider Enel asked Echelon to embed its microchips in a new series 
of smart meters that would substitute all previous electricity meters in Italy. For Enel, this was not 
just a means to implement remote reading of its meters. Its CEO aimed at providing home 
automation solutions through a partnership that culminated in acquiring 7.9% of Echelon shares and
a sit in the board (Tatò, 2016). For Echelon, it meant installing 30 mio microchips while entering a 
new market. In the subsequent years, smart grids became more important for Echelon than HVAC. 
Applications to building automation were still being made (through system integrators as well as 
through agreements with HVAC manufacturers), but power grids were the main focus.
However, most electricity providers had little interest in combining intelligent meters with home 
automation. Most of them were just interested in remote reading of meters, a basic functionality for 
which cheaper devices were available (Thoma, 2017). Even Enel lost interest in integrating home 
automation with their metering network when a new CEO was appointed in 2002 (Dolin, 2015). For
some years Echelon continued to focus on smart grids but eventually sold its operations in 2014 
(Echelon, 2014).
Echelon left the smart grid in order to enter smart lighting through the acquisition of Lumewave 
(Echelon, 2014). In the course if this transition its discourse also shifted from “distributed control” 
to the IIoT where Echelon became a key player. Echelon was founded with the idea of providing a 
general solution for the problem of control in any industry but, in practice, it could only zig-zag 
across separate markets such as HVAC, power grids and lighting (Lane and Maxfield, 2009).
What is most remarkable with these strategy shifts is that in spite of all changes, and in spite of all 
the hype on IoT and big data, Echelon never deviated from understanding itself as a firm based on 
technical excellence. Apparently, this firm has never been tempted by the possibility of using smart 
devices in order to enter the business of consumer profilation. On the one hand, its zig-zag through 
strategies and markets is an instance of change management. On the other hand, at a more 
fundamental level that defines its identity and the source of its competitive advantage, Echelon 
appears not to have ever changed. The many turnarounds of strategy are instances of adaptation 
(Cyert and March, 1963), but they are also manifestations of a core identity that is just as invariant 
as the organizational ecologies approach would predict (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984).
This ambivalence can be eventually understood by recallimg the concepts of capabilities and 
routines. Capabilities stand for firm-specific, often tacit knowledge that constitutes the core of its 
resources. Eventually, capabilities can be understood in terms of firm-specific routines if one wants 
to stress the fact that organizational knowledge is embedded in sequences of actions that are 
repeated again and again (Grant, 1991; Winter, 2000). This case-study shows that – similarly to 
other organizational features (Scott, 1998) – only core organizational capabilities and routines 
contribute to organizational inertia, whereas more peripheral capabilities can be easily adapted to a 
changing environment.
Finally, our case-study confirms the importance of managerial cognition in detecting opportunities, 
envisioning strategies and directing action (Garud and Rappa, 1994; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; 
Nadkarni and Barr, 2008; Plambeck, 2012; Hadida, 2014). In our case, Echelon’s focus on IIoT 
comes along with the identification of profit opportunities in IIoT to the detriment of those in IoT 
(see Appendix A).
A Business Model for the Industrial Internet of Things
In general, IoT/IIoT is a field surrounded by much hype and promises for big expansion, but it is
not  at  all  clear  how firms will  make profits  in  the  brave  new world of  interconnected  things.
Possibly, a hidden presumption surrounding IoT is that it will yield profits insofar it will allow the
collection of big data for consumer profilation, but how to make profits with the IIoT is still unclear.
We believe that the Echelon case is illuminating in this respect.
In  general,  IoT/IIoT experts  claim that  the  added  value  of  this  technology will  arise  out  of  a
combination  of  hardware,  software  and  semantic  capabilities.  In  particular,  single  devices  are
“smart”  insofar  they  add  logical  capabilities  to  physical  action  whereas  embedding  them in  a
network adds a semantic level to the underlying layers of logical signals and physical magnitudes
(Yoo  et  al.,  2010).  Ultimately,  customer value is  supposed to arise from the ability to link the
physical layer and the logical signals to functionalities that have a meaning for the final user or, in
short, from the ability to connect the physical to the digital world (Claro Partners, 2014; Fleisch et
al., 2014).
The main schemes proposed in the literature are reproduced in Appendix B. We found that these
schemes entail a very interesting proposition insofar they highlight that customer value arises from
the ability to bridge between the technical, physical features of devices and the logical possibilities
that arise when they are connected to one another. We also found that the Echelon case can fill this
scheme with details that make it more general and useful in other contexts.
In the early days, Echelon sold microchips that would communicate with one another through the 
proprietary protocol LonTalk (Lane and Maxfield, 2005). Echelon’s dream was that of achieving a 
near-monopolistic position in distributed control, where its proprietary communication protocol 
would be the only available bridge through which devices would communicate. This dream never 
realized, either because the big players proposed solutions that would involve their devices only 
(e.g., the HVAC industry) or because cheaper solutions were available to provide basic 
functionalities (e.g., remote reading for electricity providers). Today, Echelon makes use of an open 
communication protocol that can be used by anyone (Thoma, 2017). Instead of making profits by 
selling the real thing (i.e. the Neuron microchips, the LonTalk communication protocol), it makes 
profits by designing IIoT solutions for specific customers.
Superficially, this business model is similar to those of certain providers of open-source software 
who do not make money by selling a software which in any case is available for free, but rather a 
series of additional services that may include implementation design, installation and maintenance 
(Timmers, 1998; Gunther McGrath, 2010). However, the difference is that Echelon is not making 
profits on additional services, but rather on its main solution, namely distributed control for the 
IIoT. This fact deserves closer scrutiny.
In the 1990s and 2000s, Echelon based its solutions for building automation and the smart grid on
power line communication (PLC). The technical principle is that since electrical signals at different
frequency can travel on the same wire without confusing with one another, the wires that host a 220
V alternate current at  a frequency of 50-60 Hz can also be used in order to make sensors and
actuators communicate with one another through signals at a different frequency. Today, most IoT
applications are based on wireless communication (WC) because it is cheaper and easier to set up.
However,  both  media  have  advantages  and  drawbacks.  On  the  one  hand,  WC is  difficult  or
impossible if there are obstacles such as tunnels or large buildings. On the other hand, PLC has
trouble getting around transformers and, furthermore, its cost is typically higher than WC.
Today,  Echelon is proposing arrangements that combine WC with PLC in order to provide more
comprehensive solutions than its competitors can do. Value for the customer is created by bridging
the physical with the digital as the IIoT experts suggest (Claro Partners, 2014; Fleisch et al., 2014),
yet the value is not in the bridge itself: it’s in the pillars. The bridge – the communication protocol –
is distributed by  Echelon as open source software and can be imitated by anyone. However, the
bridge hangs from pillars that are difficult to imitate, particularly the pillar of the physical properties
of communication networks that  employ both WC and PLC. Bridges can be easily  drawn,  but
bridges rest on pillars, and at least one pillar is difficult to imitate.
Semantic Network Analysis
The above account of a possible business model for the IIoT can be understood by means of the
tools of network analysis. However, we shall consider networks where nodes represent concepts
rather  than  social  actors,  and  edges  relations  between  concepts  rather  than  social  ties.  It  is  a
semantic network rather than a social network.
Semantic  networks  are  an  established  tool,  mainly  used  in  Artificial  Intelligence,  where  nodes
represent  concepts  linked  by  logical  relations  represented  by  edges.  In  the  simplest  semantic
networks edges represent definitions or assertions, others entail more complex logical relations such
as  inclusion  of  certain  nodes  into  higher-order  nodes  or  executing  algorithms  (Sowa,  1992).
Henceforth, we shall represent our semantic network as a bipartite graph where nodes are included
in  two  subnets.  Furthermore,  our  nodes  will  be  assumed  to  be  reciprocally  interdependent
(Thomson, 1967) albeit the details of their interactions will be left unspecified.
Semantic networks have already been in organizational contexts. Notable instances are the structure
of  relationships  between scientific  theories  (Leydesdorff,  1991)  as  well  as  the  structure  of  the
relations  between the  contents  of  patents  (Yoon and Kim,  2011).  Furthermore,  social  networks
analysis approaches semantics when it finds out that innovative knowledge arises out of connecting
previously unrelated social actors (Burt, 2004; Rodan and Galunic, 2004; Rodan, 2010; Corredoira
and McDermott, 2014).
We shall apply key concepts of social network analysis to our semantic network, a combination that
has already been explored and adequately theorized (Downes, 2005; Jung and Euzenat, 2007; Mika,
2007). In particular, we shall employ the distinction between weak ties and strong ties (Burt, 1992).
In social network analysis the distinction between weak ties and strong ties has been made à propos
of social capital. In particular, social network analysis has generated two camps where social capital
is either ascribed to dense networks of social actors trusting one another (strong ties), or to networks
that are sufficiently sparse for some actors to exploit social capital by bridging structural holes in
the  network  (weak ties).  For  our  reasoning,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  recent  empirical  and
theoretical  findings  have  made  these  two  camps  more  complementary  than  alternative  to  one
another. On the one hand, empirical investigations have highlighted that these two aspects of social
capital  eventually  produce  different  effects  (Reagans  and  Zuckerman,  2001;  Hemphälä  and
Magnusson, 2012). On the other hand, both theoretical considerations and empirical investigations
suggest  that  weak  ties  meaningfully  bridge  structural  holes  if  there  are  strong  ties  of  densely
connected actors elsewhere in the network (Burt, 2000; Tiwana, 2008; Aral and Van Alstyne, 2011).
Consider on what knowledge Echelon’s competitive advantage is based. On the one hand, technical
expertise with PLC and WC: This is the first pillar, difficult to imitate particularly insofar it regards
expertise with PLC. On the other hand, all the possibilities offered by networking smart devices:
This is the second pillar, made of knowledge that is extensively discussed in specialists’ circles.
Each of these two pillars can be conceived as a set of nodes representing specific concepts: More
specifically, a node for WC and a node for PLC would constitute the pillar representing technical
expertise, whereas the pillar representing knowledge of what smart devices can do could be made of
nodes representing smart bulbs, smart meters, smart lifts, alarms, doors, and so on. These two sets
of nodes can be bridged by a communication protocol which, in this case, is freely available open-
source software developed by  Echelon. This bridge is freely available to anyone, as well as the
knowledge  embedded  in  the  second  pillar;  however,  Echelon has  some  difficult-to-imitate
knowledge in the first pillar.
By  contrast,  consider  Echelon’s  business  model  in  its  early  days,  when  it  sold  its  proprietary
communication protocol  LonTalk. In those days, value was supposed to accrue from the bridge.
Expertise with PLC was not particularly developed, whereas WC did not yet exist. Similarly, the
other pillar consisted of knowledge that was openly discussed, just as it is today.
On the whole,  the bridge-and-pillars metaphor can be used to frame different business models,
depending on what components provide value. According to this metaphor, value can either accrue
because one is able to link to previously disconnected sets of nodes, or because one controls at least
one of the two sets of nodes, or both. In the first case, value arises from a weak tie: the ability to
bridge between previously unrelated knowledge. This is the most obvious business model, the one
that Echelon adopted at first. In the second case, value arises from adding nodes and constructing
strong ties between them: by adding, or reinforcing a pillar, value arises from the ability to make
knowledge flow through freely available bridges. This is a less obvious business model, yet just as
viable as the first one.
Figure 1. The semantic network underlying Echelon's business model. On the left, the pillar made of
knowledge  about  communication  technologies:  it  is  a  network  made  of  two  nodes,  wired
communication  (WC)  and  power  line  communication  (PLC).  On  the  right,  the  pillar  made  of
knowledge about smart devices: it is a network made of a large number of nodes, here summarized
as a node for smart lighting, a node for smart grids, one for smart HVAC devices and a residual
node. The communication protocol bridges between these two pillars.
In principle one may envisage many different combinations in terms of the number and strength of
connections  between  the  nodes  that  constitute  the  pillars  (strong  ties)  or  the  ability  to  bridge
between sets of tightly connected nodes (weak ties). However, we deem that many unconventional
business models consist of creating new nodes of knowledge and connecting them with strong ties
up to have a new pillar of knowledge, rather than attempting to control the weak tie provided by a
bridge. Consider the following examples:
• Search Engines. In the early days of the Internet, many search engines battled for market
shares.  Within  a  few years  Google emerged  as  a  clear  winner  because  it  had  a  better
algorithm for presenting the results of their search. In the beginning,  Google was first to
order results by the number of hyperlinks pointing to them (competitor  Alta Vista showed
the number of hyperlinks but did not use this information to order results). Later on, Google
was the first search engine that exploited users' past searches in order to show those results
first, in which any single used was most likely to be interested. In our interpretation, the
Internet constitutes one pillar of a huge semantic network where each site is a node. Search
engines constitute the nodes of the other pillar, while using one of them amounts to throw a
bridge that allows to reach a point in the network. Among the nodes of the pillar constituted
by search engines,  Google reached prominence because it provided the best starting point
for a bridge towards the Internet. Everyone can use any search engine for free, so the bridge
in itself provides no value.  Google’s competitive advantage is rather in one of the pillars,
which it contributed to create.
• Social  Networks  Media.  Communication  media  such as  Facebook,  Twitter or  WhatsApp
arrange social contacts between users that are generally identified by cellular phone numbers
according to similar, albeit slightly different rules. In our interpretation, the social networks
– the bridges between users – arranged by these media rest on two pillars: on the one hand
the phone numbers, on the other hand the interaction opportunities and rules proposed by
Facebook,  Twitter and  WhatsApp.  These media do not extract value from the bridges that
users establish between their phone numbers, which is generally free for everyone (a minor
exception is WhatsApp requiring payment of a fee in order to be used on Saturdays). Rather,
they extract value from the possibilities they offer for building bridges out of the interaction
opportunities  that  they  provide  (strictly  speaking,  in  this  case  we  actually  have  double
bridges for any time a user links on to another user it is first a bridge from a phone number
to a social communication medium, then a bridge from the medium to a different phone
number).  Interaction opportunities and interaction rules constitute  the unique pillar  from
which communication media allow their users to throw any number of bridges towards their
knowledge of phone numbers.
• Scientific Publishers. Scientific publishing used to be quite crowded an industry, with many
publishing  houses  competing  for  a  tiny  market  where  only  a  few of  them managed  to
emerge. The advent of citation counting changed it. Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science was
the first database of scientific publications where citations, impact factors, h-index and other
metrics  created  rankings  of  journals,  books  and  their  publishers.  A few years  later  one
scientific publisher, Elsevier, created a similar database called Scopus. The Web of Science is
independent of single publishers, but Scopus is not: Since Scopus is there, Elsevier gained a
prominent position among scientific publishers. Our interpretation of this state of affairs is
that each publisher is a node in a semantic network about scientific discourse, discoveries
and trends: This becomes a pillar once a bridge is put in place. The other pillar entails the
ability to search scientific publications in order to extract meaningful indicators: This pillar
is made of two nodes, Scopus and Web of Science. A bridge between these two knowledge
pillars is created whenever Scopus or Web of Science are used in order to evaluate journals
and publishers. Unlike free communication protocols between smart devices, these bridges
provide revenues because Universities pay a fee in order to use Scopus and Web of Science.
However,  this  is  a  minor  issue.  The  remarkable  fact  is  that  the  industry  of  scientific
publishing changed because a second pillar of knowledge was created – Scopus and Web of
Science –  which  enabled  bridges  to  be  thrown  between  publishers  and  databases.  In
particular, Elsevier was quick to exploit this possibility to the most.
The Elsevier example has a sequel that suggests a more dynamical framework. Today, after Elsevier
reached a prominent position among scientific publishers, its rivals are IT-based companies rather
than traditional publishers (Pippel, 2017). The issue is that, once the whole of scientific publishing
will be online and evaluation of scientific publications will depend on quotations and downloads,
the crucial knowledge will be in the algorithms for arranging, selecting and presenting scientific
publications to users. In the new knowledge pillar that Elsevier contributed to build, other sorts of
companies may be more proficient than the pioneers.
This  circumstance suggests  an important  difference  between extracting value from bridges  and
extracting value from building pillars. Extracting value from bridges is a rather traditional, safe
activity where a stable flow of profits is likely to be harnessed. By contrast, building new pillars can
unleash forces that upset the whole industry landscape, providing revenues that may be substantial
and yet uncertain at a time.
The Demand Side
In the previous examples, a firm was able to create or modify a semantic network in such a way that
it would provide better bridges between sub-networks, or “pillars.” Launching a bridge was quite an
effortless activity, but creating a new semantic knowledge network required substantial effort and
from this activity value would eventually accrue to the firm.
In  all  previous  examples  it  was  taken  for  granted  that  consumers  would  appreciate  a  certain
functionality. There was no need to explain what new services would be provided. It was implicitly
assumed that the supply side was all what mattered, for consumers would immediately grasp the
usefulness of the service that was going to be provided.
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For instance, the launch of the post-it was problematic
because its usage was not obvious from pictures and verbal descriptions. In the very beginning, its
promoters  had  to  visit  administrative  offices  and  offer  a  few  items  for  trial  until  employees
eventually realized what they could do with it (Nayak and Ketteringham, 1994, Ch. III).
We maintain that when the usage and usefulness of a new product is not clear from the outset,
marketeers may eventually attempt to create new semantic networks in the minds of consumers
using the principles outlined above. For instance, the case of the  post-it could be interpreted as
follows. Once the  post-it had been invented, there existed a pillar made by nodes describing its
technical features, such as ‘small leaflets’ and ‘weak glue’. Consumers would buy it if they had a
pillar in their minds describing what the usage of such an object would be, so that a bridge could be
established between the concepts representing the object and the concepts representing its usage.
Showing possible usages to secretaries amounted to suggest the pillars and bridges of a semantic
network. In this case one may claim that it is the bridge that generates value, but the fact is that no
bridge could be thrown unless a pillar was there, that represented possible usages of the post-it.
Other instances are not as simple. Consider the laser, for example. Its invention triggered a cascade
of  usages  ranging  from cutting  machines  to  photocopiers  to  surgery  to  devices  for  measuring
distance (Hecht, 2010). We would propose that each of these usages is represented by a concept in
consumers’ minds, and that from each of these concepts a bridge can be thrown towards nodes
representing the laser’s technical features. Also in this case, the crucial issue is adding a concept –
figuring out a new possible usage – rather than throwing a bridge.
As in  the  Elsevier example reported in  the  previous  section,  construction of  a  new concept  in
consumers’ minds may trigger cascades where previous knowledge is destroyed to such an extent
that a whole industry is affected. We submit that the launch of the first smartphone by Apple in 2007
– the  iPhone – is one such instance. At that time, smartphones did not exist. Cellular phones did
exist, but the additional functionalities that they offered with respect to fixed phones were limited to
a clock, an alarm, sometimes a radio or a torch.  When Steve Jobs wanted to explain what the
iPhone was, he pointed to three objects that potential users already knew: the iPod – a device for
listening to music – the Internet, and phones (Apple, 2007). That is, he defined the smartphone as a
device that would combine functionalities that the public already knew. And this process went on in
the subsequent years, with smartphones including previously self-standing objects such as digital
cameras, videocameras and GPSs.
Figure 2. Steve Jobs explains what the first smartphone is: Something that allows users to listen to
music, navigate the Internet and make a call with one single object (Apple, 2007).
We  deem  that  the  pillars-and-bridge  scheme  that  we  introduced  in  order  to  explain  certain
unconventional business models can also be used in order to understand the way the smartphone
was explained to consumers. Consider existing devices as nodes in consumers' knowledge: One
node for the (classical) phone, one node for music players, one node for personal computers to
navigate the Internet – other nodes representing digital cameras, videocameras and GPSs could be
added to the picture. Steve Jobs did not create bridges between existing devices; rather, he created a
new device – a new pillar – from which conceptual bridges could be thrown towards the existing
devices. Indeed, so effective a bridge that the new device superseded many of the old ones.
Conclusions
According to Organization Science, mediating technologies are those that provide value by making
two  populations  communicate  with  one  another  (Thompson,  1967).  Typical  examples  include
banks, which mediate between lenders and borrowers, as well as web sites where people buy and
sell second-hand objects.
Similarly to the organizations that we have examined hitherto, those that are based on mediating
technologies bridge between knowledge bases. However, the organizations that inspired the concept
of  mediating  technologies  were  such  that  the  structure  of  communications  within  the  two
populations did not matter; for instance, lenders generally do not communicate with one another
and borrowers don’t do it either. In these conditions, only the bridge matters.
In many traditional  situations,  the  bridge  is  the source  of  value.  And of  course,  the  fewer the
organizations that are able to bridge between populations that would not communicate otherwise,
the greater  the profits  that  accrue to  them. In the limit,  monopolistic  profits  accrue to  the one
organization that owns the only bridge through which two populations can communicate.
In its beginnings, Echelon thought of a business model where profits would accrue from its ability
to bridge, which would be provided by its communication protocol LonTalk. It was an instance of a
simple mediating technology. However, this business model failed because it was all too easy for
competitors to create their own communication protocol.
This is quite general a pattern induced by ICT. Greater possibilities for communication make that,
in many cases, bridges must be given away for free because they are so easily imitated. At the same
time, greater possibilities for communication mean that the members of those populations between
which bridges used to mediate eventually communicate with one another, and they do it creating
structures that eventually matter for the final outcome. Bridges have lost much of their importance,
but the structure of communication within pillars of knowledge matters more than it used to do.
This provides novel possibilities for extracting value by providing novel communication structures
within each population rather than extracting tolls from the bridge that connects them. In many such
arrangements, the strong ties that create a structure of communication between tightly connected
nodes  may matter  more than the  tiny  weak ties  that  bridge  between them.  In a  sense,  we are
proposing a refinement and improvement of the concept of mediating technologies.
From a  slightly  different  point  of  view,  our  proposal  is  also  related  to  Actor-Network  Theory
(ANT),  a  sociological  theory  of  the  arousal  and  acceptance  of  innovations  that  highlights  the
interests  and politics  of  all  the  actors  involved (Hughes,  1986;  Law, 1986;  Latour,  1988).  For
instance, ANT analyzed the discovery and diffusion of vaccines highlighting the interplay between
Louis  Pasteur,  the  aims  of  the  emerging  hygienist  movement,  the  needs  of  doctors  to  retain
prominence,  military  interests  in  making  soldiers  immune  to  tropical  diseases  as  well  as  the
behavior of microbes (Latour, 1988). Our approach is certainly less detailed, less rich than ANT. In
particular, our simple scheme based on knowledge networks provides a terribly crude description of
interests and power positions which, in our case, are limited to those arising from commanding
relevant knowledge.
However, ANT bears some similarity with our proposal in that it reconstructs complex networks
where social actors make it possible for an innovation to have a value because social actors find it
convenient. ANT does not have any simple rule for generating value and, certainly, from ANT’s
point of view our bridge-and-pillars framework appears at the very least simplistic. Goals are also
different, however. ANT is a complex and generalist approach that can be applied to any innovation,
provided that sufficient resources are invested into it. Our framework does not aspire to generality
but hopes to be useful for understanding certain specific business models. From this point of view,
our  modest  contribution  may  be  hopefully  accepted  by  ANT theorists  as  a  useful  first-order
approximation.
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APPENDIX  A
Interview with Echelon CEO
Consumer and industrial market are very different. The problem with the consumer market is that,
yes, you have a lot of applications and devices to connect, a lot of opportunities and so on, but you
have few profit  margins.  We are already established in the systems of building automation,  air
conditioning and heating, systems of smart meters, as you know in Italy with Enel, so we felt it was
a natural consequence evolving towards this direction. We have the tool, the customers, and the
alliances  and now we’re investing a lot  of  money in  industrial  IoT solutions.  We’re using our
experience with LonWorks and PLC [Power Line Connection] to integrate outdoor lighting, indoor
lighting, energy management and security on a common platform.
Although the consumer IoT gets more press attention, the real financial and societal potential lies
in the industrial IoT. The cost of connecting to the IoT is dropping. Ten years ago, it was about $10
per connection, now it’s $4 for a Wi-Fi module or Echelon chip, and soon it’ll be $2. Also, and this
is important,  customers don’t really buy an ‘IoT.’ They buy solutions to certain vertical market
problems.  As  for  vertical  market  opportunities,  we  see  lighting  as  the  one  with  the  biggest
immediate potential, because connecting highly controllable and sensor-enabled LED lights can
have many, many benefits in terms of health, customer satisfaction, asset utilization and learning.
Beyond lighting,  we foresee big opportunities in transportation — such as locomotion,  aircraft
telemetry and smart traffic systems — and the smart grid.
(Sege, 2015)  
APPENDIX B
This appendix entails the received wisdom on business models for the IIoT. In particular, Figure 
(B1) shows the scheme of Fleisch et al. (2014), whereas Figure (B2) shows the scheme of Claro 
Partners (2014). Albeit neither scheme differentiates between IoT and IIoT, both of them assume 
that value coincides with customer value, thereby ruling out any possibility that the value arises out 
of the possibility of consumer profilation. Thus, we find that both schemes are particularly relevant 
for IIoT, rather than IoT.
Figure B1 (Fleisch et al., 2014). Customer value is supposed to arise at the interface between the 
physical and the digital world. Bi-directional arrows between functionality layers mean that each 
layer should be designed in conjunction with neighboring layers.
Figure B2 (Claro Partners, 2014). Customer value is supposed to arise from the ability to connect 
the physical world to the digital world.
